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One of the most vexing conundrums of 21st century warfare has been not just the explosive growth in the use of
human shields, but the apparent systemization of the tactic, particularly by nonstate actors. In noting the interna-
tional prohibition, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) deﬁnes the practice as the “intentional
co-location of military objectives and civilians or persons hors de combat with the speciﬁc intent of trying to prevent
the targeting of those military objectives.”1
Unfortunately, the international law community has yet to devise an effective way to stem the use of human
shields even as it has proliferated around the globe. To the frustration of rule-of-law armed forces, human shield-
ing has also proven quite militarily effective. In August, USA Today reported:
Last month, hundreds of ﬁghters escaped Manbij in northern Syria by placing civilians in a convoy of 500
vehicles. Hundreds of militants were killed in battle but several hundred others escaped with weapons and
may have gone elsewhere to defend Islamic State territory. The Pentagon said it didn’t ﬁre on the convoy for
fear of hitting civilians.2
For the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), this is a continuation of an approach it employed to great effect in
Iraq as well as elsewhere in Syria. Regrettably, there are no signs that ISIS intends to halt or even diminish their use
of human shields. In fact, we should fully expect it to continue and expand.
In a stunningly prescient 1994 article, Ralph Peters virtually predicted the rise of an enemy such as ISIS:
Unfortunately, the enemies we are likely to face through the rest of this decade and beyond will not be
“soldiers,” with the disciplined modernity that term conveys in Euro-America, but “warriors”—erratic
primitives of shifting allegiance, habituated to violence, with no stake in civil order. Unlike soldiers, warriors
do not play by our rules, do not respect treaties, and do not obey orders they do not like.3
ISIS—with its ideological basis and penchant for an organized “caliphate”—is not quite conterminous with
Peters’ prediction, but the similarities are obvious. Although Michael Ignatieff ’s 1998 book, The Warrior’s
Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience, predates the rise of ISIS, it offers more insight about the then emerging
phenomena of violent nonstate “irregulars” who, Ignatieff suggests, were “one reason postmodern war is so sav-
age [and] why war crimes and atrocities are now integral to the very prosecution of war.” Ignatieff points out that:
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1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 337 (2005).
2 Jim Michaels, U.S. plans to hit ISIL before militants grab human shields, USA TODAY, (Sept. 6, 2016).
3 Ralph Peters, The New Warrior Class, 24 PARAMETERS 16 (1994).
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We in theWest start from the universalist ethic based on ideas of human rights; they start from particularist
ethics that deﬁne the tribe, the nation, or ethnicity as the limit of moral concern. What many agencies,
including the Red Cross, have discovered is that human rights have little or no purchase on this world
of war.4
ISIS’sheer brutality and indifference to humanitarian norms has confounded its opponents who seek to observe
the law. Regrettably, the United States and its coalition partners seems to have largely yielded to ISIS’s use of human
shields, and doing so has come at a real military and moral cost.5 Is it always admirable, as the U.S. air commander
for operations against ISIS has said, to try to “drive [combat operations] to zero civilian casualties”?6 Certainly.
Unless, of course, that aim is executed in a way that allows an enemy to survive and to inﬂict horrors on civilians
that are worse than whatever civilian losses might have occurred had an attack been conducted in compliance with
the more permissive law of war (which allows otherwise lawful strikes that do not produce casualties that are
“excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated).”7
More-than-what-the-law-requires policy restrictions embedded in rules of engagement that limit otherwise law-
ful uses of force have resulted in severe criticism, not only on military grounds,8 but also on moral grounds.9
Though not speciﬁcally commenting on human shields, former Air Combat Command chief General (Ret.)
Mike Loh contends that overly-restrictive rules of engagement violate the “just war principle of winning quickly
with a high probability success.”10
Notwithstanding Loh’s and others concerns about current policies, the recently updated (December 2016) U.S.
Department of Defense (DoD) Law of War (LoW) Manual may may provide a conceptual legal basis for a more
aggressive use of force against those who use human shields.11 The revised Manual strengthens the emphasis on
strict adherence to the principle of distinction: those legitimately entitled to civilian status (that is, civilians who are
not directly participating in hostilities as voluntary human shields) cannot themselves be made the object of
attack.12 In addition, it elaborates extensively on the application of the proportionality rule, and the requirement
to take “feasible precautions” to protect civilians in any attack.
The revisedManual does make clear that in the DoD’s view, the “party that employs human shields in an attempt
to shield military objectives from attack assumes responsibility for their injury,” provided the attacker takes feasible
precautions to protect civilians. This point seems beyond cavil: Hays Parks, one of the world’s foremost law of war
scholars, recently made it plain that the legal responsibility for incidental civilian deaths lays not with the attacker,
but with those that employ them.13
But the revisedManual eliminates a controversial statement that in the original version concluded that harm to
human shields does “not prohibit attacks under the proportionality rule.” [§ 5.12.3.3]. Although this is simply a
reﬂection of the principle of international law expressed in the maxim ex injuria non jus oritur or “legal rights should
4 MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE WARRIOR’S HONOR: ETHNIC WAR AND THE MODERN CONSCIENCE 6 (1997).
5 Adil Ahmed Haque, Human Shields in Mosul, JUSTSECURITY (Oct. 21, 2016, 1:01 PM).
6 Jim Michaels, Exclusive: Inside the anti-Islamic State air campaign command center, USA TODAY, (Sept. 13, 2016).
7 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 1, at 46.
8 Kristina Wong, US aim for ‘zero civilian casualties’ draws criticism, THE HILL (June 24, 2015, 6:00 AM).
9 Curtis E. Lemay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, Annex 1-04 Legal Support to Operation 30 (2012).
10 John Michael Loh, ISIS campaign is unjustiﬁed, DAILY PRESS (Feb. 6, 2016, 6:18 PM).
11 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL (Dec 2016).
12 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 1, at 3, 19–24.
13 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Exclusive: Hays Parks on Human Shields and Restrictive Rules of Engagement, LAWFIRE (Oct. 17, 2016).
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not be understood to result from the commission of wrongful acts,” it generated considerable criticism (that I have
addressed elsewhere) even though current U.S. military practice is signiﬁcantly more restrictive.14
Instead, the revisedManual distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary human shields, explaining in a new
§ 5.12.3.4: that “the enemy use of voluntary human shields may be considered as a factor in assessing the legality of
an attack. Based on the facts and circumstances of a particular case, the commander may determine that persons charac-
terized as voluntary human shields are taking a direct part in hostilities.” (Emphasis added.)15
This statement seems to be half-right. Whether or not a civilian—human shield or otherwise—needs to be con-
sidered in the proportionality analysis in determining whether or not their loss is anticipated to be “excessive” in a
particular situation does not turn on their voluntary/involuntary mental state, but rather whether or not their
actions constitute “taking part” in hostilities.16 If by their behavior they take a direct part in hostilities, they lose
their protection from attack, and need not be considered in the proportionality analysis. It is hard to think of
what action could be more directly participating in hostilities than attempting to shield a bona ﬁdemilitary objective
from an otherwise legitimate attack.
Put another way, battleﬁeld realities typically make it impossible to divine whether or not the persons in an area
controlled by the enemy are voluntarily or involuntarily taking part in hostilities, and in my view the law does not
require doing so.17 Again, the inquiry is not as to the mindset of the shields, but rather whether their actions effec-
tively and directly defend enemy forces, facilities, or equipment. And it is undeniable that human shield activity, like
other efforts to defendmilitary assets, is intended to cause harm to the attacking force by preserving the defender’s
military capability. More to the point, experience suggests that the tactic works.
Writing about human shields employed in what he calls “a just guerrilla war,” Michael Gross may have (unin-
tentionally) laid out a more radical rationale for this view. Gross approvingly contends that human shields “provide
guerrillas with a low cost and effective tactic to counter the military might of their adversaries.” He insists that
“shielding has its legitimate uses” and can be a “permissible strategy of war,”when insurgents ﬁght “for a digniﬁed
life” and “self-determination.”18 Gross reaches these conclusions, however, by arguing that nonstate actors “con-
scripting human shields” are essentially the same as nation-states conscripting unwilling citizens for traditional
military service.
This raises some interesting questions. For example, should “conscripted” human shields be considered equiv-
alent to any other unwilling member of an enemy force? If the enemy obliges conscripted (and unwilling) human
shields to don some sort of uniform and declares them part of their organized armed group, does that obviate the
issue of proportionality?
Still, is it possible to address the dilemma of human shields without getting enmeshed in arguments about
whether or not human shields are directly participating in hostilities? Perhaps. If one takes the view that in eval-
uating the “concrete and direct military advantage anticipated” in conducting a particular attack, a commander
might conclude that discouraging the use of human shields is one of those advantages anticipated.19
14 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. DoD Law of War Manual and Its Critics: Some Observations, 92 INT’L L. STUD. 85 (2016).
15 This runs counter to theDoDGeneral Counsel’s predication in a lateNovember (2016) that the revisedManual would assert that both
voluntary and involuntary human shields “would not be considered to be directly participating in hostilities and would not thereby lose their
protections from attack.” Hon. Jennifer O’Connor, Applying the Law of Targeting to the Modern Battleﬁeld, (Nov. 28, 2016).
16 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.,A Squarable Circle?: The Revised DoD Law of War Manual and the Challenge of Human Shields, JUSTSECURITY, (Dec. 15,
2016).
17 Id.
18 Michael Gross, The Paradox of Using Human Shields in War, ETHICS & INT’L AFF. (Oct. 6, 2014).
19 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 1, at 46.
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That is, the United States might interpret as a proper military objective the neutralization of the effectiveness of
the enemy’s use of human shields to create an illicit sanctuary for otherwise legitimate military targets.20
Accordingly, if the aim is to demonstrate to the enemy the futility of using human shields as a way of inducing
him to abandon the tactic, accounting for human shields in a proportionality analysis might produce a different
conclusion as to what constitutes “excessive” civilian deaths than what might otherwise be the case were human
shields not part of the equation.
In the near term this approach would obviously cause civilian casualties, but it might avoid a situation where
“several hundred [ISIS ﬁghters] escaped” as was the case in Manbiji. Given the potential of ISIS ﬁghters to inﬂict
every imaginable brutality on civilians, the hard truth is that eliminating those ﬁghters could save many civilians
over the longer term. In this respect the Manual revision in § 5.12.3 concerning the evaluation of expected inci-
dental harm to civilians in relation to expected military advantage recognizes this issue. It sensibly permits con-
sidering those civilians who would be “at risk if the attack is not taken.”
Could such an approach ﬁnd its way in state practice? Maybe. Consider, for example, how quickly key nations
adopted the U.S.’s long-held view that “war-sustaining” targets (in the case of ISIS, revenue-producing oil ﬁelds
and banks) can be considered proper military objectives despite their more complex relationship to an “effective
contribution to military action” and “deﬁnite military advantage” that accepted deﬁnitions of a lawful military
objective require.21
While Oona Hathaway has observed that the “weight of scholarly opinion has long maintained that such objects
are not legitimate military targets,”22 we have witnessed in the past two years a sea change in international opin-
ion.23 Virtually no nations are now objecting to what has been at times “tidal wave” bombing of ISIS oil ﬁelds.24
Given the relatively few civilian casualties these attacks cause, and the real effect they seem to have on the enemy
(airstrikes have helped cut ISIS oil “smuggling by 95%”25), the rapid acceptance of an heretofore controversial
interpretation of the LoW is something we can expect to see more frequently in the future.
Alongside fresh interpretations of international law, the technologically advanced nations are likely to develop
new weaponry to help address the challenge of human shields. For example, the U.S. Air Force is developing the
Small Diameter Bomb II, or SDB II, which is “designed to destroy moving targets in all kinds of weather, such as
small groups of ISIS or terrorist ﬁghters on-the-move in pick-up trucks.”According to the developers, the SDB II
“is of extreme relevance against ISIS ﬁghters as the group is known to deliberately hide among the civilian
population.”26
Because the SDB II can be launched at ranges greater than forty miles, and also because it can distinguish
between certain kinds of vehicles, it may provide a better opportunity to strike the enemy before it can deploy
human shields. It appears that this counter-human-shields tactic is already being ﬁelded as USA Today further
observed that “Military planners said they will design surveillance and other intelligence to determine when mil-
itants will quit ﬁghting and attempt to escape. That might allowU.S. aircraft to strike militants before they can grab
civilians.”27
20 Id. at 29.
21 Id.
22 Oona Hathaway, The Law of War Manual’s Threat to the Principle of Proportionality, JUSTSECURITY (June 23, 2016).
23 Ryan Goodman, Targeting ‘War-Sustaining’ Objects in Non-International Armed Conﬂict, 110 AJIL (forthcoming 2016).
24 Charlie J. Dunlap, Jr., Is it always illegal and against our values to “tidal wave” or “carpet” bomb? Not necessarily, LAWFIRE (Mar. 23, 2016).
25 Ahmed Rasheed, ISIS suffers near collapse in oil revenue as it loses territory in Iraq, BUSINESS INSIDER (July 28, 2016, 9:00 AM).
26 Kris Osborn, Why Raytheon’s New Small Diameter Bomb II Could be a Game Changer, THE NAT’L INT. (Sept. 24, 2016).
27 Michaels, supra note 2.
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There are other technological capabilities that could possibly be developed to address the problem of human
shields. For example, as suggested elsewhere, facial recognition software married to a lethal microdrone could
attack enemy ﬁghters even when they seek to hide behind civilians.28 In short, technology may give now-frustrated
and perplexed commanders a means by which they can pick their way through human shields in order to strike
belligerents.
However, not all technological solutions may be to the liking to some in the international law community. For
example, I can see increasing pressure to employ non- or low-lethality weaponry in situations involving human
shields, even at the expense of rethinking current prohibitions. I have argued on LAWFIRE29 in a different context
that somewhat counterintuitively, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention
have long been seen as impeding the development of nonlethal weaponry.30 As Jonathan Alexander explained
in the Harvard International Review “[t]he treaties were established to minimize the use of these inhumane agents
that kill and maim indiscriminately. Without envisioning the possibility that some chemical and biological agents
could actually be used to reduce casualties, emotionally-based and broadly worded treaties were enacted to forbid
the use of such agents.”31
It may be that nations will want to not only seek to develop non- or low-lethal options that could involve bio-
logical or chemical processes, but to also recharacterize situations of their use against nonstate actors in nonin-
ternational armed conﬂicts who are using human shields. For example, they may describe incidents involving
human shields as “law enforcement” situations for the purpose of treaty interpretation as opposed to a means
or method of warfare (or, alternatively, they may consider the use as a matter of reprisal).32
In any event, even taking the critics of theManual’s approach to human shields at face value, the real problem is
that the detractors offer no alternative for rule-of-law nations, except to accept that ISIS and other nonstate actors
who ﬂaunt the law of war are able, de facto, to create an impregnable legal “fortresses” to safeguard their key ﬁghters
and vital military equipment if they acquire enough human shields and position them in such a way as to create a
“proportionality” conundrum. This cannot—and should not—be acceptable to the international community.
ISIS, in its human shield tactics and other affronts to the law of war, presents a particularly difﬁcult challenge for
nations adhering to international law. It is using a lawfare strategy to turn interpretations of the law of war against
those law-abiding nations seeking to stop them.33 This is exacerbated by the fact that a central pillar of the law of
war—reciprocity34—has all but collapsed, at least vis-à-vis nonstate adversaries like ISIS who believe—with good
reason35—that they have nothing to fear from the law of war.
In the search for solutions to the proliferation of human shields, we must steer away from the ICRC’s notion of
reciprocity, which is at odds with everything we know about adversaries like ISIS. Last May, Peter Maurer of the
ICRC, obviously annoyed by ofﬁcials who asked him “If ISIS doesn’t behave, why should we behave?,” snapped
28 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., The Hyper-Personalization of War: Cyber, Big Data, and the Changing Face of Conﬂict, 15 GEO. J. INT’L AFF. 108 (2014).
29 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Why didn’t the Dallas police use nonlethals against Micah Johnson? Some observations, LAWFIRE (July 18, 2016).
30 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on Their Destruction, April 10, 1972, 1015 UNTS 163; Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, January 13, 1993, 1974 UNTS 45.
31 The quote is from Jonathan Alexander, Optional Lethality, HARV. INT’L REV. (May 6, 2006).
32 Michael A. Newton, Reconsidering Reprisals, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 361 (2009).
33 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare, in NATIONAL SECURITY LAW (John Norton Moore & Robert F. Turner eds., 2015).
34 Sean Watts, Reciprocity and the Law of War, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 365 (2008).
35 Ben Taub, Does Anyone in Syria Fear International Law?, NEW YORKER, (Aug. 31, 2016).
2016 NO GOOD OPTIONS AGAINST ISIS BARBARISM 315
https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2016.4
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Duke University Libraries, on 12 Jan 2017 at 19:27:39, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms.
back that “[y]ou treat detainees humanely, because you know the other side will also treat detainees humanely.”36 Is
there anyone opposing ISIS who would expect to be treated humanely if captured by them?
The better view is to embrace the lessons from the Nuremberg Trials. There, the International Military Tribunal
observed that the “law is not static, but by continual adaption follows the needs of a changing world.”37 Do we
need to adapt to meet the challenge of ISIS’s use of human shields? In anticipating the rise of ISIS-like enemies,
Ralph Peters leveled this still-apt challenge more than two-decades ago:
Do we have the strength of will, as a military and as a nation, to defeat an enemy who has nothing to lose?
When we face warriors, we will often face men who have acquired a taste for killing, who do not behave
rationally according to our deﬁnition of rationality, who are capable of atrocities that challenge the descrip-
tive powers of language, and who will sacriﬁce their own kind in order to survive.38
Accordingly, rather than simply criticizing those trying to halt one of the most barbaric forces the world has ever
seen—while at the same time doing their best to adhere to the fundamentals of legal warﬁghting—it may be better
to work to reasonably and honorably adapt and, where necessary, reinterpret or even revise the LoW in order to
meet the extraordinarily dangerous threat of ISIS. In short, we need to innovatively create options, even imperfect
ones, for decision-makers. If the international legal community fails to do so, the LoWand international law gen-
erally risks slipping into irrelevance—a condition some ominously argue is already extant.39
36 Kimberly Dozier, International Red Cross Chief to World: ‘What the Hell?’, THE DAILY BEAST (May 2, 2016).
37 International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal (1947).
38 Peters, supra note 3.
39 Patrick Porter, Sorry, Folks. There Is No Rules-Based World Order., THE NAT’L INT. (Aug. 28, 2016).
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